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Abstract—Important changes took place in agricultural 
policies in Europe in the 19
th and 20
th century.  The dramatic 
nature of the changes are illustrated by two years, a century 
apart: 1860 and 1960.  In the 1860s European nations agree on 
a series of trade agreements which spread free trade across the 
continent.  In the 1960s European nations conclude an 
international agreement which spreads heavy government 
intervention and protection against imports across the 
continent.  This paper reviews the nature and the causes of 
these dramatic changes in agricultural and trade policies, from 
the beginning of the 19
th century to the second half of the 20
th 
century, when agricultural policies are integrated in (what is to 
become) the European Union.   
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I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY1 
European countries spend more than fifty billions of 
euro annually on subsidizing their farmers.  Over the 
past decades, European farmers have been protected 
against imports from other countries by import tariffs 
and other policies. This is not only the case in 
countries belonging to the European Union (EU), but 
also in countries such as Norway and Switzerland who 
have highly protected agricultural sectors.  The most 
important form of government intervention in 
European agricultural markets is undoubtedly the 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) of the EU.  While 
the EU has introduced several reforms of the CAP 
over the past decade, the introduction of the CAP in 
1968 installed a highly protectionist and distortive 
system of government intervention in agricultural 
markets across a large part of the continent. 
 How things had changed in a century.  Exactly a 
century before the introduction of the CAP, Europe 
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was characterized by free trade in agricultural and 
food products.  The abolishment of the Corn Laws in 
1848 signaled the end of import protection in England 
and the English-French trade agreement of 1860 was 
the start of a series of trade agreements across Europe, 
effectively removing most trade constraints in 
agricultural markets.   
 These contrasting observations beg the questions: 
how and when did this change in policy occur ? And 
why ? Which events triggered these dramatic changes 
in policy preferences in Europe over the course of a 
century and what were the fundamental causes that 
made them possible ?  These are the questions that this 
paper tries to answer.   
The methodology used in our analysis is a 
combination of qualitative argumentation and 
quantitative analysis.  We have collected long-run data 
and calculated policy indicators and structural 
variables. The paper presents indicators of agricultural 
protection and various explanatory variables for 
several European countries, including France, UK, 
Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Finland, and 
Sweden. Data are collected at commodity level (eg 
protection indicators), at sector level (eg incomes; 
value added; etc) or at country level (eg political 
institutions; electoral rules; etc). The paper uses these 
indicators to document changes in agricultural policies 
and relates the indicators with a qualitative discussion 
of the factors behind the changes (such as political and 
policy changes).    
A key element in the paper is how institutional 
changes have affected government decision-making on 
agricultural protection.  Over the long period analyzed 
there were important institutional changes in the 
political system, such as changes in voting rights. 
There is a burgeoning literature on the impact of 
political institutions on economic performance (e.g. 
Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006; North, 1991; Persson 
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and Tabellini, 2000; Przeworski and Limongi, 1993).  
The impact of political systems on trade policy has 
been the subject of a series of theoretical and 
econometric studies (e.g. Beghin and Kherallah, 1994; 
Beghin et al. 1996; Dutt and Mitra, 2005; Grossmann 
and Helpman, 2005; Olper 2001; Swinnen et al. 2001).  
However most of these studies focus on cross-section 
data and there is relatively little insights from long run 
studies on the historical relationship between these 
political systems and trade protection.  Our paper will 
attempt to make a contribution in this field.  
Another important part of the analysis is how the 
the changing role of agriculture and food in the 
economy with economic development  affect the costs 
and benefits of protection – and thereby the political 
equilibria. Changes in the structure of the economy 
affect the distribution and the size of political costs 
and benefits of agricultural protection and thus the 
government’s political incentives in decision-making.  
In Swinnen (1994, p.2) I argued that “structural 
changes typically coinciding with economic 
development induce an increase in agricultural 
protection” and that “the empirically observed 
correlation between agricultural protection and 
economic development is caused by a multiplicity of 
factors”. This is consistent with hypotheses from other 
political economy studies which have analyzed the 
impact of several of these factors and have concluded 
that governments adjust agricultural policies in 
response to changes in structural changes which affect 
the costs and benefits of agricultural protection for 
different interest groups, and their ability to organize 
politically and influence the government (Anderson, 
1995; Anderson and Hayami, 1986; Bullock, 1992; de 
Gorter and Tsur, 1991; Honma and Hayami, 1986; 
Riethmuller and Roe, 1986; Swinnen, 1994, 1996; von 
Witzke, 1990)
2. In this paper we review evidence on 
European agriculture to see whether these arguments 
are consistent with empirical evidence and whether 
they can explain the growth in protection over the past 
century and a half.  
One argument which is related to structural 
changes, but which shows much more dynamic 
volatility and historical fluctuation is the relative 
income situation of farmers. Both theoretical and 
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empirical studies show that changes in market returns 
will induced political activies of farmers as well as 
changes in political incentives for governments to 
intervene (de Gorter and Tsur, 1991; Gardner, 1987; 
Swinnen and de Gorter, 1993).  From the evidence 
presented here it will become clear that this was a very 
important element in government decision-making on 
agricultural policies. 
The period covered in this paper is from the 
beginning of the 19
th century until the countries join 
the Common Agricultural Policy of the European 
Union – which is at the end of the 1960s for the initial 
members of the EU.  For analyses of more recent 
periods, I refer to the studies by, among others, Grant 
(1997), Moyers and Josling (2002), Josling (2007a), 
Olper (1998) and Pokrivcak et al. (2006).  This paper 
relates to other studies who have tried to document the 
evolution of European agricultural policy (such as 
Tracy, 1989 and Josling 2007b) and those that have 
tried to explain the variation in protection between 
commodities and over time (such as Anderson and 
Hayami, 1986; Krueger et al., 1992; Gardner 1987).  
Some of these studies which use long-run data (such 
as Gardner (1987) and Swinnen et al. (2001)) show 
that important insights can be gained from long run 
analyses in addition to studies focusing on cross-
country differences. 
In the next sections I will attempt to measure 
changes in agricultural policy and I will review 
economic and political changes that took place in the 
19
th and 20
th century in Europe to try to explain what 
caused the agricultural policy changes themselves.   
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